Its been a while since I posted something (you know how it is, life intervened) so it's fitting that I should write about something close to my mind, if not my heart- yes, my area of academic interest: the discourse of political-violence.
ETA: Not writing for a while really shows. Sorry for the clunky text that follows (though it is International Relations so how exciting could it have been anyway?)
Al Qaeda released its first statement after the election of Barack Obama and it is not pretty. Most of the media reports have been focusing on the use of racial epiteths against Obama in the statement. I think the real story is in the way AQ has wasted little time in signaling that it is business as usual for them. Those, such as Andrew Sullivan for instance, who thought that the Obama era would make it more difficult for radical groups to rail against the USA, the statement puts an end to that sort of thinking. It shows that all that will happen is that al Qaeda and other groups will adapt their rhetoric in the service of the same position against America and try to undermine the positive feeling in the US and elsewhere.
The trope that the media has focused on is that Obama is simply a stooge of 'whites' and of the establishment. This is mildly interesting to me. I don't think being politically correct is particularly important to groups like these. What is more interesting (and alarming) to me is that the statement actively states that Obama's polices are a continuation of previous policies and that there will be no let up in the 'Islamic' movement against the US. Basically, there's no trial waiting period here folks...the statement seems designed to address voices that said that having a US President with the middle name of Hussein would seriously stymie fundamentalists. Bosh.
This should not surprise those of us who take theories of identity about the fundamental self/other relationship seriously. Simply put, actors (states, groups, people) become attached and entrenched in adversarial relationships because it is a source of fundamental stability and sense of purpose to juxtapose oneself against an 'other'. In the realm of the political, the key distinction is the 'friend/enemy' distinction as Carl Schmitt told us writing in 1927. Having a stable enemy, despite the many costs it ay bring, gives actors a better and more coherent sense of self in the political arena and this is why there was never any way that there would be any active reconsidering of the US by Al Qaeda and vice versa....it's just interesting to see it all play out so starkly. It doesn't fundamentally matter who the President is, the rhetoric would have adapted but stayed the same. So if we had had Hilary Clinton, the tropes would have been undeniably sexist and violent, if it had been McCain, the trope would have been more triumphalist and Bush-centric....but the essential stance will not change.
For those who place a premium on theories of leadership, this kind of episode once again highlights my fundamental unease with theories that place too much explanatory power on leaders. It's just a lot more complex than that.
OK IR musings done... apologies to Carl Schmitt for massacring his theory, though he was a Nazi figurehead which makes me considerably less sorry.
In the end, the only comfort this statement brings me is that it makes those people that pushed the 'pals around with terrorists' argument look pretty darn stupid...once again. But oh wait, they probably don't read the papers. Or maybe they read them all but can't name a single one.
Showing posts with label IR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IR. Show all posts
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Wednesday, October 1, 2008
Do Norms Matter part 2: the N deal
Congress approved the US's nuclear deal with India today. Under the agreement, India will be able get material and technical support for its civilian nuclear program and in return will open up 14 of its nuclear sites to inspections.
This move is note worthy for several reasons:
First, it is a rare victory for the Bush administration's foreign policy, and particularly in a very bad week for the administration. I mean congress actually passed something Bush wanted- weird. Relations with India have been one of very few foreign policy successes of the Bush administration in general so we should take note of this moment.
Second, if you believe the hyperbole, this is a 'tectonic' moment in not only Indo-US relations but also in the development of the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself. Making an exception of India signals many things - it validates the idea that liberal democracies stick together (a variant on the 'democratic peace' thesis), it opens up the pressing question of demonstration effects on other undeclared nuclear states and it recognizes that there is a range of behaviors within the category of nuclear non-proliferation norm violators, eroding the salience and the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime itself. The deal jolts the shaky foundations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, while still showing that states want to abide by it. Third, despite the easy passage of the bill, there is much disagreement on the impact and moral salience of the bill. We are not done with this at all.
So, does this mean that nuclear non-proliferation norms have comprehensively failed? Sure looks like it- the US is actually rewarding 'bad' behavior like testing nuclear weapons, right? Not if you read Karthika Sasikumar's fascinating work on India and the non-proliferation order. According to Sasikumar, the 'norms worked' by forcing India to act in regime compliant ways, even as an outsider to the regime. By this interpretation, India should be seen as an exception that proves the efficacy of a set of still stringent rules. It will not be easy for other states to make the same case that India did and thus the standards of acceptable nuclear behavior remain high.
Of course, the counter-argument is the one that will get the most coverage in the next few weeks. This is the argument that the deal sets a dangerous precedent and will encourage other states, including 'rogue' states to also openly violate non-proliferation norms. Rebutting such behavior will be hard to justify, given the preferential treatment given to India.
My take on this: This is a toughie. On the one hand, I agree that India is a special case, given its record which stands out against the behavior of the usual suspects (A Q Khan anyone?). I also understand the benefits that the deal brings in both material and symbolic terms- not the least of which is the promise it holds for India's rapidly growing energy needs. Thirdly, the deal exposes the sham that the structure of the nuclear regime was which was built on the discriminatory premise of freezing into place the power hierarchies of the post second world war period. Out of the weakening architecture of the non-proliferation regime, comes an opportunity to rethink what non-proliferation means in todays day and age.
What I'm concerned about is the reaction from two quarters- the jingosm that I predict in India and the reaction of other undeclared states. I fear that the deal will dilute the already waning nuclear non-proliferation order.
Let me explain. No doubt there will be a lot of celebration in certain quarters in India - validating the enormous expense of developing nuclear weapons programs and the risk that comes with testing nuclear weapons with Pakistan as a neighbor. There are few things I find as disagreeable as Indian jingoism and we will see a lot of it in the days to come, specially from those that will tout India's growing relations with the US as validation of India's arrival as a great power.
Apart from the crude spectacle of excessive nationalism, we should be wary of such self-congratulation for other reasons. Even while acknowledging that India's nuclear record has been exemplary in terms of responsibility in upholding non-proliferation norms, we should worry about the resentment this will breed in the subcontinent. More importantly for me, the deal signals India's growing embrace of 'real politik'. India's great strength in the nuclear non-proliferation order was not its material capability but its ethical argument about the in built discrimination or 'apartheid' of the regime. We should not lose this moral ground by touting our 'power'.
Moving beyond India, the precedent this sets for other undeclared nuclear powers is troubling. Not because the US will be compelled to similarly reward other states (which it won't) but because this decision will erode the 'nuclear taboo' that has held strong for 50 years, despite the flaws of the non-proliferation regime. We should be alert to the demonstration effects the deal will have on other regimes and the arguments that will become 'thinkable'.
To put it mildly, the process of negotiating the deal has been turbulent - it nearly brought the current coalition government down in India when the CPIM bailed out in protest. It has been furiously opposed by left liberals in India and by Democrats in the U.S. This passage is probably not the end of the story - but it is a landmark day in the ongoing saga. It's too early to predict the long-term effects of the deal but that won't stop all of the talking heads ( including me!)
Bottom line: I don't know yet.
Edited 10/02/08 to add: According to the BBC, already Pakistan is arguing that Washington needs to extend a similar deal to Islamabad. Now this is just a bit rich. I'm no Pakistan basher (making fun of lecherous Presidents does not count) but with its rather dodgy chain of command, history of proliferation and you know, just that little matter of A Q Khan, I think this smells of a little boguosity...but, it just underlines the point about precedents set.
This move is note worthy for several reasons:
First, it is a rare victory for the Bush administration's foreign policy, and particularly in a very bad week for the administration. I mean congress actually passed something Bush wanted- weird. Relations with India have been one of very few foreign policy successes of the Bush administration in general so we should take note of this moment.
Second, if you believe the hyperbole, this is a 'tectonic' moment in not only Indo-US relations but also in the development of the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself. Making an exception of India signals many things - it validates the idea that liberal democracies stick together (a variant on the 'democratic peace' thesis), it opens up the pressing question of demonstration effects on other undeclared nuclear states and it recognizes that there is a range of behaviors within the category of nuclear non-proliferation norm violators, eroding the salience and the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime itself. The deal jolts the shaky foundations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, while still showing that states want to abide by it. Third, despite the easy passage of the bill, there is much disagreement on the impact and moral salience of the bill. We are not done with this at all.
So, does this mean that nuclear non-proliferation norms have comprehensively failed? Sure looks like it- the US is actually rewarding 'bad' behavior like testing nuclear weapons, right? Not if you read Karthika Sasikumar's fascinating work on India and the non-proliferation order. According to Sasikumar, the 'norms worked' by forcing India to act in regime compliant ways, even as an outsider to the regime. By this interpretation, India should be seen as an exception that proves the efficacy of a set of still stringent rules. It will not be easy for other states to make the same case that India did and thus the standards of acceptable nuclear behavior remain high.
Of course, the counter-argument is the one that will get the most coverage in the next few weeks. This is the argument that the deal sets a dangerous precedent and will encourage other states, including 'rogue' states to also openly violate non-proliferation norms. Rebutting such behavior will be hard to justify, given the preferential treatment given to India.
My take on this: This is a toughie. On the one hand, I agree that India is a special case, given its record which stands out against the behavior of the usual suspects (A Q Khan anyone?). I also understand the benefits that the deal brings in both material and symbolic terms- not the least of which is the promise it holds for India's rapidly growing energy needs. Thirdly, the deal exposes the sham that the structure of the nuclear regime was which was built on the discriminatory premise of freezing into place the power hierarchies of the post second world war period. Out of the weakening architecture of the non-proliferation regime, comes an opportunity to rethink what non-proliferation means in todays day and age.
What I'm concerned about is the reaction from two quarters- the jingosm that I predict in India and the reaction of other undeclared states. I fear that the deal will dilute the already waning nuclear non-proliferation order.
Let me explain. No doubt there will be a lot of celebration in certain quarters in India - validating the enormous expense of developing nuclear weapons programs and the risk that comes with testing nuclear weapons with Pakistan as a neighbor. There are few things I find as disagreeable as Indian jingoism and we will see a lot of it in the days to come, specially from those that will tout India's growing relations with the US as validation of India's arrival as a great power.
Apart from the crude spectacle of excessive nationalism, we should be wary of such self-congratulation for other reasons. Even while acknowledging that India's nuclear record has been exemplary in terms of responsibility in upholding non-proliferation norms, we should worry about the resentment this will breed in the subcontinent. More importantly for me, the deal signals India's growing embrace of 'real politik'. India's great strength in the nuclear non-proliferation order was not its material capability but its ethical argument about the in built discrimination or 'apartheid' of the regime. We should not lose this moral ground by touting our 'power'.
Moving beyond India, the precedent this sets for other undeclared nuclear powers is troubling. Not because the US will be compelled to similarly reward other states (which it won't) but because this decision will erode the 'nuclear taboo' that has held strong for 50 years, despite the flaws of the non-proliferation regime. We should be alert to the demonstration effects the deal will have on other regimes and the arguments that will become 'thinkable'.
To put it mildly, the process of negotiating the deal has been turbulent - it nearly brought the current coalition government down in India when the CPIM bailed out in protest. It has been furiously opposed by left liberals in India and by Democrats in the U.S. This passage is probably not the end of the story - but it is a landmark day in the ongoing saga. It's too early to predict the long-term effects of the deal but that won't stop all of the talking heads ( including me!)
Bottom line: I don't know yet.
Edited 10/02/08 to add: According to the BBC, already Pakistan is arguing that Washington needs to extend a similar deal to Islamabad. Now this is just a bit rich. I'm no Pakistan basher (making fun of lecherous Presidents does not count) but with its rather dodgy chain of command, history of proliferation and you know, just that little matter of A Q Khan, I think this smells of a little boguosity...but, it just underlines the point about precedents set.
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Do Norms Matter?
IR bloggers are taking an interest in the ongoing saga of the Somali pirates who have hijacked a Ukranian ship and are demanding millions of dollars (20 at last count) in return. The pirates (I can't get over how old-school the whole concept of pirates seems- blame Johnny Depp) gave an interview to the NYT.
In it they employ some arguments that should be of interest to all of us who argue that discourse is a good gauge of the salience of particular international norms. For instance,
The Somali pirates are using arguments that appeal to our sense of justice in several ways - comparing themselves to legitimate law enforcers such as the coast guard and behaviors such as 'patrolling', appealing to our environmental concerns, and contesting language that is pejorative.
Yet, they are holding the Ukranian ship and its crew hostage and are demanding a ransom that is incommuserate with their stated reasons for wanting money.
So this begs the question, what use is it to know that actors acknowledge or (instrumentally) appeal to international norms? In the blogs I've read, the consensus seems to be that this is a case of insincere rhetoric, because it is belied by the actions of the pirates.
How, then, should we interpret the desire of the pirates to be seen as legitimate human beings? Should this guide the way the situation is handled? For instance, if the pirates said that they wanted the money to buy rum, eye patches and sail the high seas- would the ship have been stormed by now? If the pirates subscribed to a set of norms that were even less palatable, how would it effect responses?
These are the difficulties in thinking about how norms work in real life. It's a much bandied about term but it leaves us with little substance with which to think about how to formulate policy in crises.
I'm trying to grapple with these questions in my own work, so no real answers...just thinking aloud.
In it they employ some arguments that should be of interest to all of us who argue that discourse is a good gauge of the salience of particular international norms. For instance,
We don’t consider ourselves sea bandits,” he said. “We consider sea bandits those who illegally fish in our seas and dump waste in our seas and carry weapons in our seas. We are simply patrolling our seas. Think of us like a coast guard.”
The Somali pirates are using arguments that appeal to our sense of justice in several ways - comparing themselves to legitimate law enforcers such as the coast guard and behaviors such as 'patrolling', appealing to our environmental concerns, and contesting language that is pejorative.
Yet, they are holding the Ukranian ship and its crew hostage and are demanding a ransom that is incommuserate with their stated reasons for wanting money.
“Killing is not in our plans,” he said. “We only want money so we can protect ourselves from hunger.”
When asked why the pirates needed $20 million to protect themselves from hunger, Mr. Sugule laughed and said, “Because we have a lot of men.”
So this begs the question, what use is it to know that actors acknowledge or (instrumentally) appeal to international norms? In the blogs I've read, the consensus seems to be that this is a case of insincere rhetoric, because it is belied by the actions of the pirates.
How, then, should we interpret the desire of the pirates to be seen as legitimate human beings? Should this guide the way the situation is handled? For instance, if the pirates said that they wanted the money to buy rum, eye patches and sail the high seas- would the ship have been stormed by now? If the pirates subscribed to a set of norms that were even less palatable, how would it effect responses?
These are the difficulties in thinking about how norms work in real life. It's a much bandied about term but it leaves us with little substance with which to think about how to formulate policy in crises.
I'm trying to grapple with these questions in my own work, so no real answers...just thinking aloud.
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